NOTES
NLRB REMEDIES-ATTORNEY'S FEES IN

REFUSAL-TO-BARGAIN CASES
Tribunals in the United States have traditionally refrained from
awarding attorney's fees and other litigation expenses to successful liti-

gants, absent contractual or statutory authority.' The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), although lacking express statutory authorization, recently has strayed from this policy by awarding attorney's fees
as one aspect of its relief in certain unfair labor practice cases. 2 The
justification for this departure is that -he remedy is needed in these
cases in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) 3 and is therefore within the Board's broad remedial au-

thority under section 10(c) of the NLRA.This Note will examine the award of attorney's fees by the NLRB

in the context of the refusal-to-bargain situation 5 involving extended
frivolous litigation where conventional NLRB remedies have proven
most inadequate.

It will discuss the Board's present reluctance to take

the more controversial step of adopting make-whole relief, 6 and it will
consider those situations in which the Board is willing to make an attempt to partially cure the inadequacy of conventional remedies by as1. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other
Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1931).
2. Principally, these have been cases arising under section 8(a) (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970), although the issue also has been
litigated under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act, id. §§ 158(a)(1), (3). See
note 49 infra.
3. Id. §§ 151-69.
4. Id. § 160(c). This section, which governs the remedial power of the NLRB,
reads in pertinent part:
Mhe Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be
served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from
such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this Act. . . . Id. (emphasis added).
5. A refusal of an employer to bargain with a union which is the representative
of his employees is made an unfair labor practice by section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA,
id. § 158(a)(5).
6. A make-whole order requires the employer to reimburse his employees for the
increased benefits they would have had during the period the employer illegally refused
to bargain had a collective bargaining agreement been executed at the outset See text
accompanying notes 13-17 infra.
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sessing litigation expenses against the defeated charged party.

The

scope of -the Board's authority to award attorney's fees under section
10(c) of the NLRA will be probed in light of its effect in achieving
the purposes of the NLRA as well as in light of the Act's legislative
history and judicial interpretation. Although various arguments can be
made in opposition to an NLRB remedy which includes litigation expenses-one such objection being the American judicial tradition
against the awarding of attorney's fees-the countervailing considera-

tions in favor of the remedy will be shown sufficient to overcome them.
Finally, the Note will conclude that the award of attorney's fees to a
successful party in a frivolous refusal-to-bargain case is within the
remedial authority of the Board, while, on the other hand, an order
directing reimbursement of the Board's own litigation expenses is not

authorized.
THE INADEQUACY OF CONVENTIONAL

NLRB REMEDIES

The ineffectiveness of conventional NLRB remedies in unfair la-

bor practice cases, especially in refusal-to-bargain cases, has been the
cause of increasing criticism in recent years. 7 The problem stems from
the fact that the Board's orders cannot be enforced until an enforce-

ment proceeding is held in a federal court of appeals. 8 Thus, a party
guilty of an unfair labor practice can avoid compliance with the provisions of the NLRA for the long interval between the initial filing of
a charge with the Board and the final decree of the appellate court,
7. See, e.g., Hearingson H.R. 7152 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Note, NLRB Power to
Award Damages in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 84 HAIv. L. REV. 1670 (1971); Note,
An Assessment of the Proposed "Make-Whole" Remedy in Refusal-To-Bargain Cases,
67 MicH. L. REV. 374 (1968).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970). The relevant portion of this section provides the
exclusive method by which the Board's orders may be enforced: "The Board shall have
the power to petition any court of appeals of the United States... for the enforcement
of such order. . .

."

Id.

If temporary relief is found needed by the Board, it may petition a federal district
court for a restraining order or other appropriate temporary relief at any time after a
complaint has been issued by the Board or its designated agent. Id. § 160(j). But in
practice, this relief is seldom used. See Note, NLRB Power to Award Damages, supra
note 7, at 1671 n.12. Congress has considered the possibility of making NLRB orders
self-enforcing. See generally Hearings on H.R. 7152, supra note 7. Self-enforcing
Board orders would alleviate the problems caused by the delay inherent in the present
system. See note 9 infra. Therefore, it would decrease the need for the Board to use
the attorney's fees remedy as a means of discouraging litigants from taking advantage
of current weaknesses in the system in order to nullify the guarant es of the Act.
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notwithstanding intermediate NLRB orders.' Since there is 'no legal
sanction for refusing to obey a Board order before it is enforced by
a court of appeals, the only sanction the willful violator typically risks
is the eventual enforcement of 'the conventional Board order directing
him to cease and desist from his unlawful activities. Therefore, if the
delay operates to the violator's advantage, he actually is encouraged to
prolong this interval of noncompliance and to absorb the mild reprimand rather than end his unlawful practices pursuant to an intermediate Board order.
The problem is especially pronounced in refusal-to-bargain cases.
In the typical refusal-to-bargain situation, the employer refuses to
recognize a majority union, many times certified by the Board, as the
collective bargaining representative of his employees and hence refuses
to bargain with it. The refusal to bargain often is accompanied by
other unfair labor practices designed -to undermine union support during the resulting period of delay. 10 The conventional NLRB remedy
in this situation is a cease and desist order coupled with an order directing the employer to bargain with the union." The employer has
9. In practice, the minimum interval between the initial filing of a charge with the
NLRB and the enforcement proceeding in a court of appeals is currently around two
years. NLRB Release No. R-1297 (August 7, 1973) (Remarks of Edward Miller, then
Chairman of the NLRB, before the Labor Relations Law Section of the American Bar
Association), reprinted in R. SMrrH, L. MEnmrLD & T. Sr. ANrroINs, LABOR RPL'roNS LAW 68, 69 (5th ed. 1974).
10. Obvious examples of tactics designed to undermine union support include the
harassment and discharge of union supporters in violation of sections 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1970), and 8(a)(3), id. § 158(a)(3), of the NLRA and retaliatory
changes in the terms and conditions of employment in violation of section 8 (a) (3) of
the NLRA.
The Heck's string of cases, involving eleven different NLRB proceedings over the
course of nine years, provides a classic example of resistance to union organization
through extensive unlawful anti-union conduct. Heck's, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 886 (1971),
relief enlarged sub nom. Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 546 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 417 U.S. 1 (1974); Heck's, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 951
(1969); Heck's, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 2231 (1968), enforced in part and remanded in part
sub nom. Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Heck's, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 777 (1968); Heck's, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 178 (1968), enforced
in part and remanded in part sub nom. Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 418
F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Heck's, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 186 (1967) and 166 N.L.R.B.
674 (1967), enforced as modified, 390 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1968) and 398 F.2d 337 (4th
Cir. 1968), modified sub nom. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969);
Heck's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1966); Heck's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1151 (1966), enforced per curiam, 387 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1967); Heck's Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 121 (1966),
enforced per curiam, 387 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1967); Heck's, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 760
(1966), enforced as modified, 386 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1967); Heck's, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B.
1565 (1965), enforced per curiam, 369 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1966).
11. R. Smrrir, L. MRRUMELD & T. ST. ANTonwm, supra note 9, at 592.
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much to gain by delaying his compliance with -this order until the final
decree of the appellate court. In the first place, he does not have to
bear the expense of the increased benefits his employees would likely
have enjoyed during that period had a collective bargaining agreement

been negotiated. Second, the union is likely to lose support among
his employees because of his continued antagonism towards union supporters, which is designed to frighten them away, and because of the
long interval during which the union seems to be accomplishing very
little. Thus, when the employer finally has been forced to the bargaining table, the union may find that its bargaining strength has been
eroded significantly. 2 Yet, with the conventional remedy there will
be no restitution for these "losses" when the employer finally is forced

to comply by the appellate court's enforcement of the Board's order.
NLRB RESISTANCE TO MAKE-WHOLE RELIEF

Faced with a lack of congressional action to cure the ineffectiveness of conventional remedies,' 8 labor unions recently have begun
pressing the Board for so-called make-whole relief in refusal-to-bargain
cases.' 4 With this type of relief the
union are reimbursed by the employer
presumably would have had during the
initially had bargained with the union.

employees represented by the
for the increased benefits they
period of delay if the employer
In the case where the employer

asserts frivolous objections' 5 to the union's certification as the collective
12. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1249 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970); Note, An Assessment of the Proposed"MakeWhole" Remedy, supra note 7, at 328 n.16.
13. Although Congress has considered enacting legislation which would make
NLRB orders self-enforcing, no action has yet been taken. See note 8 supra.
14. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo County & N. Santa Barbara County Restaurant &
Tavern Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. 1082 (1972), affd sub nom. Culinary Alliance Local 703
v. NLRB, 488 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1974); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970),
enforced sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir.), vacating 449 F.2d 1046
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
15. Make-whole relief is inappropriate where the challenge is based on a "debatable
question." USW v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 519, 521-22 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The distinction
between "debatable" and "frivolous" objections stems from the fact that there is no direct
judicial review of the legality of representation proceedings. The only way for an employer to obtain judicial review is to refuse to bargain, to be charged with an unfair
labor practice, to be ordered to cease and desist, and ultimately to press his claims at
the enforcement proceeding before a court of appeals. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f)
(1970). Therefore, if the employer's defenses are legitimate, he should not be penalized
by the imposition of the make-whole remedy merely for seeking an authoritative determination of the Board's decision in the court of appeals.
A challenge is 'frivolous' when it "appears from a bare inspection to be lacking
in legal sufficiency, and in any view of the facts does not present a defense." BLACK'S
LAW DIcIONARY 795 (4th ed. 1968). For example, a challenge was found to be 'frivo-
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bargaining representative and refuses to bargain with the result that
collective bargaining is delayed during the extended litigation period,

the proponents of this extraordinary remedy argue that the employer
ought to bear the cost of these "lost" benefits pursuant to a Board-imposed hypothetical collective bargaining agreement.'
Furthermore,
argue the proponents, since the employer will be discouraged from un-

justifiably refusing to bargain, the policies of the NLRA will be effec17
tuated through the encouragement of collective bargaining.

Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
accepted this argument and has concluded that the Board may grant
make-whole relief,18 the Board remains unconvinced. 10

The Board's

lous" where an employer made the bald assertion that the Regional Director had acted
"arbitrarily and capriciously" in certifying a union as the collective bargaining representative of the employees, where this certification was made pursuant to an agreement for
a consent election which by its terms made the Regional Director's determination final
and binding, and where the employer did not come forward with any evidence whatsoever to suggest that this determination should be questioned. Tiidee Prods., Inc., 174
N.L.R.B. 705, 707 (1969), rev'd and remanded sub nom. International Union of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970). On
the other hand, a challenge was found to be "debatable" where an employer refused to
recognize or bargain with a union which had obtained eleven of seventeen employee authorization cards because of its doubt as to actual majority support. Marsal Transp.,
Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (Oct. 12, 1972), 1972 CCH NLRB Dec. 31,810.
16. See Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-toBargain Cases, 14 WAYNB L. Rnv. 1059, 1063-65 (1968). The authors of this article
were counsel for the union in the Ex-Cell-O case, 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enforced
sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir.), vacating 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), a leading decision in the make-whole relief controversy.
17. See Schlossberg & Silard, supra note 16, at 1067-68.
18. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970). The Board first faced this argument in Ex-Cell-O
Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enforced sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058
(D.C. Cir. 1971), vacating 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and rejected it. A representation election was held in the Ex-Cell-O plant which resulted in the union being
selected as the collective bargaining representative of the Ex-Cell-O employees. The
company contested the results, but after a full hearing before an NLRB official, the
union was certified. Seeking further review before the Board and the courts, the company refused to bargain. An unfair labor practice proceeding resulted. In the action
before the Board, the union requested make-whole compensatory relief. While ordering
the company to bargain with the union, the Board denied the request, reasoning that
such relief amounted to compelling contractual agreement in contravention of section
8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), quoted in note 20 infra, that it was
too speculative, and that it would constitute an illegal penalty. 185 N.L.R.B. at 10910.
The Board's decision was appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, where the court reversed the Board and remanded the case for further consideration of the make-whole relief. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir.), vacated
sub nom. Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Citing its decision in International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), the UAW court noted that the Board had the authority
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principal objections to the remedy are that it amounts to compelling
contractual agreement in contravention of section 8(d)20 of the NLRA
and that, in any case, it is too speculative. 1 Insofar as no other circuits
have decided -the question,2 2 the Board appears to be applying the
remedy only to cases which can be appealed to the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals.2 Thus, in light of the unsettled nature of
under section 10(c) of the NLRA to award this kind of relief for the harm caused by
the employer's frivolous challenges to the certification proceeding and the accompanying
unjustified refusal to bargain. It reasoned that because of the importance to the statutory scheme of the enforcement of the obligation to bargain and the desire to reduce
frivolous litigation, the award would "effectuate the policies" of the Act by making an
employer monetarily liable for his unreasonable delaying tactics. 449 F.2d at 1048.
19. In spite of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in ExCell-O and other cases, see, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426
F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), the Board has continued to
maintain the position that it lacks the authority to award make-whole relief. See J.P.
Stevens & Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (Aug. 31, 1973), 1973 CCH NLRB Dec. 33,142.
See note 23 infra.
20. Section 8(d) of the NLRA provides in part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) (emphasis
added).
The Supreme Court has cautioned the Board that it has no authority to "compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements." NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952). See H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). For a discussion of Porter,see note 80 infra.
21. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 109-10 (1970), enforced sub nom. UAW
v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir.), vacating 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The
relief is considered too speculative since there is no way of determining what the terms
of the agreement might have been had there been one. Id. at 110.
22. See Culinary Alliance Local 703 v. NLRB, 488 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1974), where
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a Board decision denying make-whole relief. Without deciding the question of the Board's authority to grant a make-whole remedy for loss of collective bargaining benefits, the court found that the misconduct of the employers' association involved was not so egregious as to justify the imposition of an extraordinary
remedy. Id. at 666.
23. See J.P. Stevens & Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (Aug. 31, 1973), 1973 CCH
NLRB Dec. 33,143. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals had remanded
the case to the Board for consideration of the make-whole remedy. Responding to the
remand, the Board noted that in Ex-Cell-O
we announced our view that the Board lacks statutory authority to grant a
make-whole remedy for alleged loss of hypothetical collective-bargaining benefits. We note the [District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals'] disagreement with this view of the scope of the Board's statutory remedial authority
in this area. Inasmuch as we have accepted the remand in the instant case,
in deference to the court's view, we shall assume for the purpose of this case,
that we possess the necessary authority to grant such relief in an appropriate
case. Id. at 33,144.
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the Board's authority to grant make-whole relief and of the selective

and reluctant use of the remedy by the Board, the current usefulness
of make-whole relief is marginal.
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND OTHER LITIGATION
EXPENSES IN LIEU OF MAKE-WHOLE RELIEF

The NLRB has recently made an attempt to partially cure the inadequacy of its traditional remedies by assessing litigation expenses
against the employer who has unjustifiably refused to bargain, rather
than taking the more controversial step of awarding make-whole relief.
In International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 24 the District
of Columbia Circuit upheld the Board's decisions in the Tiidee Products, Inc. cases 25 which awarded attorney's fees to the union when the
employer's conduct of the litigation had been characterized as "fivolous. '26 In an attempt to organize a plant belonging to Tiidee Products, Inc., a manufacturer of parts for mobile homes, the union filed
an election petition with the NLRB Regional Office. 7 Pursuant to the
petition, Tiidee entered into an agreement for a consent election with
the union. The agreement provided for an election by secret ballot
and also provided that any objections to the election would be submitted to the NLRB Regional Director, whose decision after investigation would be final and binding. The election was held and the union
was selected to represent the Tfidee employees. Tildee subsequently
24. 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974), enforcing Tildee Prods., Inc., 196 N.L.R.1B. 158
(1972) (Tildee II supp. decision), and 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972) (Tidee I supp. decision). Tildee I and Tiidee If involved prosecutions for different unfair labor practices
arising out of the same labor dispute. For the facts of this dispute, see text accompanying notes 27-30 and note 30 infra. The Tiidee litigation, which was consolidated on
appeal for enforcement of the supplementary orders, can be summarized as follows:
Tildee I: Tjidee Prods., Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 705 (1969), rev'd and remanded sub
nom. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), supplementary decision on remand, Tildee Prods., Inc., 194
N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972), enforced sub nom. International Union of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3390 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 1975) (No. 842).
Tiidee II: Tiidee Prods., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 969 (1969), rev'd and remanded sub
nom. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
supplementary decision on remand, Tildee Prods., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 158 (1972), enforced sub nom. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
25. Tiidee Prods., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 158 (Tiidee II supp. decision); Tiildee Prods.,
Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (Tildee I supp. decision).
26. 502 F.2d at 355. For an explanation of the '"rivolous" characterization, see
note 15 supra.
27. Representation questions are governed by section 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §
159 (1970), and accompanying NLRB regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.17-.30 (1974).
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challenged the election, claiming, among other things, -that the union
had violated the agreement for the consent election by distributing a
leaflet to the employees on the day of the election.28 In accordance
with the agreement, the issue was submitted to the Regional Director,
who, after an investigation, overruled the objections and certified the
union as the employees' exclusive bargaining representative. Tiidee
nonetheless refused to bargain with the union, claiming that the Regional Director had acted arbitrarily and capriciously and had denied
the company due process.2 9 It refused to meet with union representatives until all litigation had been completed. 0
The case then came before the Board which, after consideration
of the merits, adopted the trial examiner's decision finding Tiidee in

violation of section 8(a)(5)31 of the NLRA for its refusal to recognize
and bargain with the union as the exclusive bargaining representative
pursuant to the Regional Director's certification.8" An order was en-

tered requiring the company to bargain collectively with the union

8

The union appealed -the Board's decision to the Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit, while the Board made application
to the court for enforcement of its order against Tiidee. 84 Complaining
that the remedies prescribed by the Board were inadequate, the union

asked for a remand for further consideration of compensatory relief,
including make-whole relief.

The court found that Tiidee's refusal to

28. 174 N.L.R.B. at 707 (Tiidee I).
29. Id.
30. Id. Tiidee also refused union requests for information pertaining to existing
wage and fringe benefits and engaged in such unfair labor practices as interrogation of
employees to determine the identity of union adherents (a violation of section 8(a) (1),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970)), increasing production quotas of employees who supported the union (a violation of section 8(a)(3), id. § 158(a) (3)), and discharging employees in order to retaliate against them for selecting the union (also violative of section 8(a) (3)). 174 N.L.RB. at 707-11.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
32. 174 N.L.R.B. at 714 (Tiidee I). The Board also found Tiidee in violation of
both section 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970), for widespread interference with,
coercion, and restraint of its employees, and section 8(a)(3), id. § 158(a)(3), for retaliatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment and for discriminatorily
laying off and discharging employees in retaliation for union support. 174 N.L.R.B. at
714.
33. 174 N.L.R.B. at 707 (Tiidee I). After the Board hearing in this case, the company posted a set of work rules and regulations prohibiting solicitation and distribution
on the premises. In Tiidee II, the Board found these rules and other company conduct
176
in violation of sections 8(a)(1)-(4), 29 U.S.C. H9 158(a)(1)-(4) (1970).
N.L.R.B. at 976.
34. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1245 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), rev'g and remanding Tiidee Prods., Inc., 174
N.L.R.B. 705 (1969) (Tiidee I).
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bargain "was a clear and flagrant violation of the law, 'a5 and that its
objections to the election proceedings were "patently frivolous." a It
concluded that the NLRB was authorized to grant a make-whole remedy in this kind of situation and remanded the case to the Board for
further consideration of that remedy.3 7 At the same time, the court
specifically suggested that the Board should consider the assessment of
litigation expenses as a means of advancing the policies of the Act if
it was unwilling to take the more extreme step of awarding make-whole
38
relief.
The NLRB responded to the remand by adopting the less extreme
remedy, and it ordered Tiidee to reimburse both the Board and the
union for the litigation expenses incurred as a result of the frivolous
objections Tildee had asserted to the election and certification process
in the ensuing litigation.30 The Board concluded that it possessed
the authority to grant this kind of relief, reasoning -thatindustrial peace
could best be achieved if "speedy access to Board and court dockets
was available." 40 Relying on its decision in an earlier case,41 ,the Dis35. Id. at 1248.
36. Id.

37. Id. at 1253.
38. id. at 1251 n.11, 1253 n.15.
39. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1236 (Tildee I supp. decision). Tiidee II, the case involving
Tiidee's additional misconduct, was appealed in International Union of Elec. Workers
v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1970). This case was also remanded for the considcration of additional relief. See note 24 supra.
40. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1236 (Tiidee I supp. decision). The conclusion in the Tildee
I and Tildee If supplementary decisions represented a shift in the Board's position as
to its authority to award litigation expenses. It had earlier denied a request for this
remedy in Heck's, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 2231 (1969), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Food
Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1970), a similar refusalto-bargain case. Heck's resistance to unionization had already resulted innine proceedings before the NLRB at the time of this proceeding. See note 10 supra. The Board
concluded that Heck's did not entertain any good-faith doubt concerning majority support for the union, basing its conclusion on Heek's "flagrant repetition" of unfair labor
practices. Id. at 2233. The union requested affirmative relief including reimbursement
of litigation expenses. The Board denied that request, and formulated a conventional
remedy including an order certifying the union as collective bargaining representative
and directing Heck's to bargain with the union. The District of Columbia Circuit, in
Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1970), reversed
and remanded the case to the Board for further consideration of other affirmative remedies in light of the court's then recent decision in the Tiidee I appeal, International
Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1969). On Heck's remand,
the Board added certain other supplementary remedies, for example, ordering the company to mail notices of the Board's amended order to the homes of employees, to provide the union with access to plant bulletin boards for one year, and to provide
the union with the names and addresses of employees. Heck's, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B.
886 (1971), relief enlarged sub nora. Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB,
476 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 417 U.S. 1 (1974). The
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trict of Columbia Circuit upheld this supplementary decision. 42 However, it reversed the portion of the order directing reimbursement to
the Board for the Board's own litigation expenses.4 s
The question of the NLRB's power to award litigation expenses
is far from settled. The case on which the District of Columbia Circuit
Court relied in enforcing the Board's orders in the Tiidee cases was
subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, though on other
grounds. 44 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has reserved its opinion
on the question, 45 and no other circuits have ruled on the matter. 48
Board, however, again refused to award litigation expenses. It reasoned that the public
interest in awarding the charging party litigation expenses did not outweigh the general
prohibition against awarding these expenses. Id. at 889.
41. The Tiidee I court relied upon Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 476
F.2d 546, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 417 U.S. 1 (1974). There
is a striking circularity of approach involved in this line of decisions. The Board reacted
to the court's strong remand in Tiidee I by imposing attorney's fees in the Tiidee I supplementary decision, 194 N.L.R.B. at 1236; the court then relied on this supplementary
Board order in Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir.
1973), to justify the imposition of attorney's fees. Finally, the court relied on the Food
Store precedent in the consolidated appeal of the Tiidee I and Tiidee 1I supplementary
decisions to sustain the Board's orders imposing attorney's fees in the supplementary
Board Tiidee I and Tiidee I1 decisions. 502 F.2d at 352.
42. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
enforcing Tiidee Prods., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 158 (1972) (Tiidee H supp. decision), and
194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972) (Tiidee I supp. decision). The opinion in this case was written by Judge MacKinnon who had dissented in the earlier Tiidee decisions. Although
Judge MacKinnon was of the opinion that section 10(c) of the NLRA did not authorize
the Board to award attorney's fees, the Food Store opinion and the principle of stare
decisis compelled him to affirm the Board's decision to award attorney's fees. In the
Tiidee I appeal, the court had characterized the employer's refusal to bargain as a "clear
and flagrant violation of the law" and had labeled its objections to the election and certification process "patently frivolous." 426 F.2d at 1248. This characterization put it
within the category of cases where affirmative compensatory relief would be appropriate.
502 F.2d at 355.
43. For a discussion of this aspect of the decision, see text accompanying notes 12032 infra.
44. NLRB v. Food Store Employees Local 347, 417 U.S. 1 (1974), rev'g 476 F.2d
546 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Court reasoned that Congress had "invested the Board, not
the courts, with broad discretion" to fashion remedies. Id. at 8. Thus, the court of
appeals had exceeded its authority in expanding the remedy ordered by the Board. Consequently, the Supreme Court ordered the appellate court to remand the case to the
Board if it felt the Board's remedy was inadequate. Notably, the Court left open the
question of whether the Board's affirmative remedial powers included the power to order
reimbursement of litigation expenses. See id. at 8 n.9.
45. Id.
46. The question reached the Eighth Circuit in Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v.
NLRB, 496 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 9,
1974). The court denied the union's request for the relief but did not need to decide
whether or not the Board had the authority to order relief which included attorney's fees
because it found that the employer's litigation was not frivolous. Frivolity has been the
touchstone for the award of such relief by the Board. See note 15 supra.
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Yet, unlike the issue of make-whole relief, the Board itself 'has decided

that it has the authority to award litigation expenses in cases of frivolous
litigation,47 despite the unsettled status of the question in -the courts.

Even though the Board has not actually awarded attorney's fees to any
other litigants, it has applied its reasoning in Tiidee to numerous cases
subsequent to that decision.48 Thus, this type of relief would seem to
continue to be an important tool in the Board's remedial arsenal for
49
refusal-to-bargain cases.
COST OF LITIGATION IN NLRB PROCEEDINGS

At first glance, it would appear -that a union which objects to an
employer's unfair labor practice would incur little, if any, litigation expense since section 3(d) of the NLRA assigns the task of investigation
and prosecution of unfair labor practice cases to the NLRB General
CounselY° After the filing of a charge by the union 51 and upon the
47. Tiidee Prods., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1236 (1972) (Tiidee I supp. decision).
48. See, e.g., Condon Transp., Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (June 10, 1974), 1974
CCH NLRB Dec. 34,483; Ameri-Crete Ready Mix Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (Nov.
21, 1973), 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. 33,498; South Hoover Hosp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1077
(1972). It is interesting to note, however, that the Board has apparently not actually
awarded attorney's fees in any cases since Tiidee. It continues to find the relief inappropriate in each situation. Thus, in South Hoover, where the employer's defenses were
patently frivolous, the relief was not appropriate because its conduct in this first violation of the Act was attributable to its gross ignorance. 196 N.L.R.B. at 1081. In
Anied-Crete, 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. at 33,499, and Condon, 1974 CCH NLRB Dec.
at 34,485, the relief was not appropriate because the defenses asserted were not so insubstantial as to constitute frivolous objections.
49. The Board also apparently would apply the remedy to situations outside the refusal-to-bargain situation, see Wagreen Co., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 15 (Sept. 24, 1973), 1973
CCH NLRB Dec. 33,263, including against unions, see Teamsters Local 901, 210
N.L.R.B. No. 153 (May 29, 1974), 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. 34,392. Walgreen involved
violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970), for
the employer's unlawful interference and discrimination in a representation proceeding
but did not involve a refusal to bargain. Local 901 involved union misconduct in violation of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(4), id. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), (4). The union had
used threats and violence to induce employees to join a strike. The Board apparently
considered the remedy applicable in both cases but refused to reimburse the litigation
expenses of the charging party in either case on the ground that the charged party's defenses were not frivolous.
50. Section 3(d) provides in part:
The General Counsel of the Board shall exercise general supervision over all
attorneys employed by the Board... and over the officers and employees in
the regional offices. He shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board,
in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section 10, and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board
29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
51. In order for the NLRB to take action in a particular case, the aggrieved party
must file an unfair labor practice charge with a regional office. The NLRB has no authority to begin proceedings itself:
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issuance of a complaint by a Regional Office of the NLRB, 52 the General Counsel or his representative has the statutory duty to prosecute
the case initially in a hearing before an administrative law judge; and
if a proceeding before the Board or the courts eventually becomes
necessary, the General Counsel will likewise prosecute the case before
the appropriate tribunal.58 Presumably, then, the union would not incur any legal expenses once the Board machinery had been set in motion by the filing of the charge.
In practice, however, this is not the case; in order for a charging
party to adequately represent himself in extended litigation, especially
in situations where the NLRB attorney takes a position different from
his as to the merits of various aspects of the case, the party may incur
substantial litigation expenses. To begin with, under the current procedure, the charging party must promptly submit supporting evidence
once the charge has been filed, or the complaint will be dismissed. 4
Furthermore, the charging party may participate in the hearing before the administrative law judge, may submit a brief, and may make
oral argument at the close of the hearing.5 5 After the judge has made
his decision, the charging party is given an opportunity to file exceptions with the Board in order to obtain review. In the Board proceeding, the charging party may again file a brief and petition for oral
argument.56 If an enforcement proceeding then is required in the
courts, the charging party will again be entitled to participate. Thus,
at every stage of an NLRB proceeding private legal counsel is permitted, and indeed the charging party may find private counsel necessary in order to insure that he is effectively represented. In cases
where private counsel is required and which involve extended litigation, like the refusal-to-bargain cases, the litigation cost involved will
obviously be substantial.
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any
such unfair labor practice, the Board. . . shall have power to issue and cause
to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect,
and containing a notice of hearings before the Board. . . . Id. § 160(b) (emphasis added).
52. After a charge has been filed in a Regional Office, the Office conducts an investigation and issues complaints in cases it deems meritorious. Id. § 153(d). See note
50 supra.

53. Id. For a more detailed summary of NLRB procedure in handling complaints
and prosecuting unfair labor practice cases, see R. Sasrrs, L. AMun'm & T. ST. ANTOINE, supranote 9, at 63-68.

54. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1974).
55. Id.§ 101.11(b).
56. Id.
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SCOPE OF NLRB AuTHORrry UNDER
SECTION 10(C) OF THE NLRA

The power of the NLRB to award attorney's fees, if it has such
a power, must come from its section 10(c) authority to "take such affirmative action, including reinstatement with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies of this [Act]." 5 Of course it is well settled
that the affirmative action authorized is not limited to reinstatement
with or without back pay. This phrase is merely illustrative of the type
of relief intended. 58 Yet, the ultimate extent of the Board's authority
has never been clearly defined.
The legislative history of the NLRA, 59 although far from conclusive on the matter, lends support to the proposition that affirmative
relief, such as the award of attorney's fees, was within the contemplation of the Wagner Act Congress. In fact, one commentator has concluded that the legislative history authorizes any form of compensatory
damages.60 The section 10(c) affirmative action clause of the NLRA
was intended to give the Board broad discretionary authority in fashioning its remedies,61 and it was enacted in spite of repeated criticism that
it was "too indefinite and very dangerous. ' 62 Moreover, the cited
precedent for ,the type of authority given by the clause was the corrective power of an equity court. 68 Since the court of equity, rather than
the court of law, more often made exceptions to the general rule
against the reimbursement of attorney's fees,"4 the fact that the equity
powers were cited would suggest that such relief was within the contemplation of the draftsmen of the Act.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). For a more complete quotation of section 10(c),
see note 4 supra.
58. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). See text accompanying notes 77-79 infra.
59. For a complete collection of all pertinent legislative documents, see U.S. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RLATIONS ACT, 1935 (1949).
60. Note, NLRB Power to Award Damages, supra note 7, at 1683-87.
61. See COMPARISON OF S.2926 (73D CONG.) AN S. 1958 (74TH CoN.), 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1935), reprinted in 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra
note 59, at 1360. The author of the report noted, "An effort to substitute express language... necessarily results in narrowing the definition of restitution, which may include many other forms of action." Id.
62. Hearing on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 3, at 449 (1935), reprintedin 2 NATIONAL IABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra
note 59, at 1835.
63. COMPAISON OF S.2926 (73D CoNG.) AND S. 1958 (74TH CoNG.), supra note
61, at 34.
64. See text accompanying notes 98-100 infra.
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It is notable that Congress specifically has authorized the award
of attorney's fees by the courts in many other statutes, including the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 65 the Clayton Act, 66 the Communica6 8 This fact
tions Act of 1934,67 and the Interstate Commerce Act.
suggests that when Congress intends to permit federal courts to award
attorney's fees in a particular situation, it will explicitly authorize it.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has found congressional authority for
this type of award in the absence of explicit legislation. In Hall v.
Cole,69 the Court upheld the award of attorney's fees by a court under
a rather broad statute authorizing courts to grant "such relief . . . as
may be appropriate. '7 0 In a suit brought under a section of the Securi-

ties Exchange Act, a section which did not specifically authorize the
award, 1 the Court said in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 7 2 that the

inclusion of specific provisions for awarding attorney's fees in one section of -theAct "should not be read as denying to the courts the power
to award counsel fees in suits under other sections of -the Act when

circumstances make such an award appropriate ...

,,73 On the other

hand, the detailed available remedies under the Lanham Act 4 led the
Court in Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.75 to conclude that the congressional intent was to exclude litigation expenses
65. "Mhe court may . . . assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, against either party litigant," 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970). Another provision of
the Act also authorizes the award of attorney's fees. Id. § 78r(a).
66. "Any person. . . shall recover. . . the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. § 15.
67. "[Siuch common carrier shall be liable . . . for . . . a reasonable counsel or
attorney's fee .... ." 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
68. "If the plaintiff shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's
fee. . . ." 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
69. 412 U.S. 1 (1973). The case involved a suit brought by a union member
against the union under section 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). The member had introduced a set of resolutions at a
union meeting alleging instances of undemocratic actions and shortsighted policies of
union officials. He subsequently was expelled from the union because his actions allegedly violated a union rule. This expulsion constituted a violation of the member's
right of free speech secured by section 411(a) (2) of the Act. 412 U.S. at 3.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970). The court found the case to fall within one of the
exceptions to the traditional rule against the awarding of attorney's fees. This exception
is discussed in the text accompanying note 98 infra.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 14(a) (1970).
72. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
73. Id. at 390-91.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970). In actions brought to recover damages for patent
infringement under the Lanham Act, "the plaintiff shall be entitled. . . to recover (1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action." Id.
75. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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as a form of recovery for the successful party, even where there had
been "deliberate" trademark violations. 70
Although these cases dealt with the power of a court and not the
power of an agency to award attorney's fees without express statutory
authorization, by way of analogy they tend to support the proposition
that the proper interpretation of section 10(c) includes -the power of
the NLRB to award such fees. The fact that the remedy is explicitly
authorized in other statutes does not preclude a finding that it also is
authorized under section 10(c). Furthermore, consistent with these
decisions, a broad grant of authority in fashioning relief, like that found
in section 10(c), as opposed to a detailed listing of available remedies,
would seem -toinclude the power to award litigation expenses.
The broad and general authority of the NLRB to fashion relief
under section 10(c) was established by the Supreme Court early in the
Act's history. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 77 the argument was
made that the phrase "including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay" in section 10(c) limited the Board's affirmative action powers to this remedy. 78 The Court disagreed, holding instead
that the phrase was not -a limitation but a mere illustration of the -type'
of relief intended. It went on to outline the nature of the power in
a well-known passage:
[I]a the nature of things Congress could not catalogue all the devices
and stratagems for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could it
define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate these policies in an
infinite variety of specific situations. Congress met these difficulties by
leaving the adaption of means to end to the empiric process of administration. The exercise of the process was committed to the Board, sub79
ject to limited judicial review.
Subsequent -to the Phelps Dodge case, various limitations were
placed on the reach of the Board's remedial power. For example, the
Board cannot "compel agreement when the parties themselves are un80
Anable to agree" because this contravenes section 8(d) of the Act.
76. Id. at 716-17.

77. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
78. Id. at 194.

79. Id.
80. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970), considering 28 U.S.C. §
158(d) (1970). In this case, the company had refused to bargain with the union with
respect to the inclusion of a "check-off" clause in the agreement. The purpose of the
clause was to have the company deduct from the employees' payroll checks the dues
owed to the union by its members. The NLRB had found that the refusal to bargain
was not made in good faith, but rather for the purpose of frustrating the negotiations.
Accordingly, it ordered the company to grant the union a contract check-off clause.
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other example is the restriction against granting punitive relief."'

On

the whole, however, the breadth of the Board's affirmative powers un-

der section 10(c) remains substantially unimpaired by these decisions
and has been consistently reaffirmed by the Court. 2
THE AwAD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AS A MEANS OF
EFFECTUATING THE POLICIES OF TiE ACT

The foregoing analysis suggests at most that the award of attorney's fees may be authorized -by section 10(c) of the NLRA and at
least that such relief has not been precluded. The question still remains, however, as to whether the remedy is one which will "effectuate

the policies" of the Act.88
The purpose of the NLRA, as declared in section 1 of the Act,
is to prevent interruptions of commerce caused by industrial disputes.8 4
Congress found that one means of protecting commerce from the interruptions caused by labor disputes was to encourage "the practice and
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order amounted to compelling the company to agree to specific terms which compulsion would "violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under governmental supervision of the
procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract."
Id. at 108.
81. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938), the Court said that
the power of the Board
to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive, and is to be exercised
in aid of the Board's authority to restrain violations and as a means of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation where those consequences are of
a kind to thwart the purposes of the Act. Id. at 236.
The company involved in this case was allegedly supporting a union of its own choosing
without regard to the employees' preferences. This relationship resulted in several contracts between the union and the company. The company subsequently was found in
violation of the Act for interfering with the right of its employees to join labor organizations of their own choosing in contravention of section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §
157 (1970). As one remedial measure, the Board invalidated the contracts. The Court
reversed this part of the order, labeling it punitive because it could find no basis for
the Board's finding that the contracts were a consequence of the unfair labor practices.
Id.; cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
82. See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973); Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177 (1941).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). For quotation of the pertinent statutory language,
see note 4 supra.
84. Id. § 151. The pertinent portion of the section reads:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
'by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. Id.
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procedure of collective bargaining. '85 By assuring employees of the
right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and giving them the chance to enforce this right in a legal proceeding, Congress thought employees would be less inclined to resort to
economic force with its resultant injury to commerce. The stated purpose of the Act has led the Supreme Court to conclude that the "[e]nforcement of the obligation to bargain collectively is crucial to the statutory scheme" of the NLRA. 8
Yet, under the present scheme and with the conventional Board
remedy applied in refusal-to-bargain situations--a prospectively oriented cease and desist order-a party wishing to avoid collective bargaining simply can refuse to bargain without risk of legal sanction until
an enforcement proceeding is concluded in a court of appeals. There
is no encouragement to bargain at any time before the Board's order
is enforced with a judicial order, and, in fact, it will be advantageous
in many cases for an employer to prolong delay as long as possible and
to absorb the mild reprimand when the cease and desist order finally
is enforced. 7 Not only does this result seem not to promote collective
bargaining, an express purpose of the Act, but it is unjust to the union
whose conduct in the matter has been entirely proper. In the first
place, the union is forced to incur substantial litigation expense in
vindicating fundamental employee rights guaranteed by the NLRA. 8
Furthermore, this cost may prove to be an excessive economic burden
on some unions, in particular the small, under-financed union, and it
may substantially impair their ability to conduct their affairs. 89 And
yet with conventional NLRB remedies, there will be no restitution for
these pecuniary losses when the litigation 'has finally ended. 90 Meanwhile, the employer has been rewarded for his recalcitrance through
the reduced effectiveness of the union which has been attempting to
organize his plant.' It seems unlikely that Congress would have sanctioned a result which is inequitable and which discourages good faith
collective bargaining in contravention of the purpose of the NLRA.
85. Id.
86. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952).
87. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
89. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 356 n.24
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
90. It is permissible for the Board to seek to restore an injured party to the status
quo ante through its remedial power. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194
(1941); International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 356 n.24 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
91. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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Thus, some means of discouraging an employer's unjustified refusal to bargain and of restoring the injured party to the status quo ante
at the end of the frivolous litigation is needed in order to fully effectuate the policies of the NLRA. While make-whole relief9" would perhaps be the most effective remedy in this situation, at least the awarding of attorney's fees would help to return the union to its economic
status prior to the unfair labor practice and hence permit it to function
effectively after the close of litigation. The remedy also would serve
to discourage the employer from engaging in frivolous litigation by
pegging the size of the eventual relief assessed against him directly to
the length of his unjustified delay.
The alternative award of litigation expenses as a partial curative
in lien of make-whole relief also has the advantage of avoiding the
principal objections to make-whole relief. One such objection is that
make-whole relief contravenes the rule against compelling the parties
to agree. 93 Obviously no such problem exists in the case of awarding
litigation expenses. A second objection to make-whole relief is that
it is entirely too speculative since the Board has no way of determining
what the terms of the agreement would have been had there been
one. 94 It has been argued that this deficiency can be overcome simply
by comparing similar collective bargaining agreements in similar situations.9 5 Yet, the award of litigation expenses in lieu of the makewhole remedy can avoid the problem altogether since this amount is
readily ascertainable.
OPPOSITION TO A REmEDY WHICH INCLuDES
LITIGATION EXPENSES

The award of attorney's fees to the charging party in cases where
the charged party engages in frivolous litigation in order to delay compliance with the Act would seem entirely within the intent and spirit
of the NLRA. But several arguments in opposition to this remedy can
be made.
The General Rule Prohibitingthe Award of Attorney's Fees
The principal objection to the remedy stems from the American
rule which generally prohibits the award of attorney's fees to a success92. See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
93. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
94. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 110 (1970), enforced sub nom. UAW
v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir.), vacating 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
95. See Note, An Assessment of the Proposed "Make-Whole" Remedy, supra note

7, at 382-84.
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ful litigant absent statutory or contractual authority.96 The primary
rationale for the prohibition is that while the submission of rights to
judicial determinatioa is favored over self-help, parties will be discouraged from settling their disputes in judicial proceedings if the loser
will be assessed with his adversary's litigation costs merely because he
submitted the controversy to judicial determination. 97 However, there
are well established exceptions -to the rule, and a court may, in the

exercise of its equitable powers, award attorney's fees in certain instances. For example, the court may -award counsel fees to a successful party when the opposing party has exhibited bad faith in the conduct of the proceedings.18

A second exception allows the award of

attorney's fees when the plaintiffs successful litigation confers "a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where

the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately
among them." 9 This exception is based on a theory of unjust enrichment, and it has its origins in the "common fund" cases where the
plaintiff has secured a fund in which others may share. Awards of attorney's fees have been paid out of such funds.100
Although these exceptions to the general rule deal with the equi-

table powers of a court, they seem -tobe equally applicable -to an agency
like the NLRB which functions in essentially the same manner as a
court. Arguably, an administrative agency possesses no equitable
powers and possesses only those powers conferred on it by the statute
96. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973); McCormick, supra note 1, at 621-22.
97. McCormick, supra note 1, at 639-40.
98. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); 6 J.MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE If 54.77(2),
at 1709 (2d ed. 1972); see, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
99. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970). Although the
power to award attorney's fees under this exception is generally limited to cases involving a fund, such as creditor's suits or suits for the protection of a trust fund, 6 J. MOORE,
supra note 98, 1 54.77(2) at 1705-06, it has been extended to cases where no fund was
created by the litigation. For example, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970), a stockholder brought a derivative suit against his corporation under the Securities Exchange Act to set aside a corporate merger which allegedly was accomplished
through the use of a misleading proxy statement. The stockholder succeeded and the
defendant corporation was assessed with his litigation expenses. Although the suit created no fund out of which fees could be paid, the Court concluded that the litigation
had conferred a substantial benefit on the other stockholders. The Court therefore reasoned:
To award attorney's fees in such a suit to a plaintiff who has succeeded in establishing a cause of action is not to saddle the unsuccessful party with the
expenses but to impose them on the class that has benefited from them and
that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit. 396 U.S. at 396-

97.

100. 6ve Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S, 1, 5-7 (1973).
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which created it.' 01 But the broad remedial power of the NLRB pursuant to section 10(c) of the NLRA is essentially equitable in na02
,ture.1
In fact, the Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge0 3 said that the
power extends beyond the "narrow canons for equitable relief
deemed suitable by chancellors in ordinary private controversies."'10
The award of attorney's fees in the refusal-to-bargain situation
may possibly fit both of these exceptions to the general prohibition
against the award of such fees to a successful litigant. The company
which refuses to bargain and asserts frivolous objections throughout the
proceedings merely for the purpose of delay has by definition exhibited
bad faith in the conduct of the proceedings. Hence the bad faith exception to the rule is directly applicable. The application of this exception does present a problem, however. It has often been characterized
as essentially punitive in nature. 0 Juxtaposed to this characterization
are the numerous Supreme Court statements to the effect that the
Board has no power to issue punitive orders. 06
However, automatic 'application of this characterization to the
situation where litigation expenses are awarded to a party who has
been unreasonably forced -to litigate would overlook the true nature of
the relief. To characterize it as "punitive" in the sense that the term
has been used by the Supreme Court in NLRB cases 0 7 would seem
erroneous. The underlying rationale for the "punitive" restriction apparently has been that a Board remedy may not go beyond making the
injured party whole.' 08 Reimbursing the charging party for his litiga101. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 352-54 n.*
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Although Judge MacKinnon, the author of the opinion, felt compelled to join the two other judges on the court in affirming the Board's decision to
award litigation expenses, see note 42 supra, he expressed, in a series of footnotes, his
own view that the Board lacked the authority to grant this kind of relief. See id.
at 352-54 n.*, 354-55 n.**, 357 n.***.
102. See Brief for Respondent at 13-14, International Union of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
103. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
104. 313 U.S. at 188.
105. "In [the bad faith] class of cases, the underlying rationale of 'fee shifting' is,
of course, punitive .... ." Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
106. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961); Republic Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197
(1938).
107. One commentator has suggested that the "punitive" label has not been applied
in its usual sense at all in NLRB litigation, but merely has been used to describe Board
orders which have seemed particularly objectionable to the courts. Note, NLRB Power
to Award Damages, supranote 7, at 1680.
108. In Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940), a leading case on the issue
of punitive awards, the Court characterized as "punitive" a Board order compelling the
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tion costs in the situation where the charged party resists compliance
with the Act by engaging in frivolous litigation merely returns 'the union
to its economic status quo ante; it receives nothing, nor is the employer
required to pay anything, over and above the actual expenses the union

has incurred in opposing the employer's dilatory actions.
The award of attorney's fees in the refusal-to-bargain situation
also could be viewed as within the "common fund" exception to the
rule."0 9 The union has brought an 'action on behalf of the employees

who have selected the union as their collective bargaining representative. The employees have benefited substantially by the successful liti-

gation of the union through the enforcement of the obligation to bargain and resultant increased benefits. Hence, the union should be
compensated for its efforts.
There are at least three problems with this last argument, 'however. To begin with, it proves too much. According to this rationale,
the award would be appropriate in any situation where the union litigates on behalf of the employees. Second, there is obviously no fund
involved from which reimbursement of attorney's fees can be made.
Finally, although the exception has been extended to cases where no
fund was created as a result of the litigation, the rationale has been
that the award is one which imposes -the expense on the class benefited
rather than on the unsuccessful party. 110

In this case, the reimburse-

employer to repay public agencies the amounts the agencies had paid to discriminatorily
discharged employees as wages on work relief projects during the period of their unemployment. The award obviously had nothing to do with restoring the union or the employees to their respective positions prior to the unfair labor practice. It merely increased the size of relief assessed against the employer.
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938), the Court labeled as
"punitive" the Board's invalidation of several contracts entered into between the company and a company-supported union. The Court found no basis for the Board's conclusion that the contracts were a result of the unfair labor practice, so again the remedy
did not make the union whole because the contracts had nothing to do with the company's unlawful conduct toward the union. For a more complete discussion of Consolidated Edison, see note 81 supra.
In NLRB v. Coates & Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1957), the court took
the position that an order would not be punitive if it either made the injured party whole
or prevented the violator from benefiting from his misdeed. Id. at 561.
109, See Brief for Respondent, supra note 102, at 17-18. See notes 99-100 supra and
accompanying text.
110. See note 99 supra. See also Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'1 Bank, 307 U.S. 161
(1939). In Sprague, the plaintiff and fourteen other settlors had made trust deposits
in the bank. The bank closed and went into receivership. The plaintiff brought an action against the bank and the receiver to establish a lien for her trust deposit. The district court entered a decree establishing the lien and also directed payment of attorney's
fees to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court upheld the award of attorney's fees, reasoning
that for all practical purposes, a fund was established since the plaintiff had established
the claims of the fourteen other trusts by stare decisis.
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ment of the union's litigation expenses would, on the contrary, seem
to saddle the employer with the expense.
ProceduralAspects of the NLRA Which Indicate that the
Relief is Inappropriate
Certain procedural features of the NLRA tend to indicate that this
form of affirmative relief is inappropriate. First of all, there is no direct
judicial review of the certification process. The only way the employer
can obtain judicial review of the legality of the union election and certification procedure is to refuse to bargain,"' and yet in refusing to bargain he risks being assessed the union's litigation expenses as well as
bearing his own costs. After proceedings before an administrative law
judge, the Board, and finally the courts, the costs could be substantial." 2 Of course, -theremedy is not applicable in cases where the employer's objections to the certification process are debatable, as opposed to frivolous."13 Obviously, the employer who refuses to bargain
for frivolous reasons has no reasonable doubt as to the legality of the
election. Yet, as a practical matter and without -the benefit of hindsight, at the margin it may be difficult to distinguish between "debatable" and "frivolous" claims."' Thus, the employer with marginally
debatable claims will be unjustly discouraged from obtaining review of
the union's certification by refusing to bargain with the union.
The argument, however, has been stripped of its forcefulness in
application. The Board apparently has taken this factor into consideration in applying the Tiidee rule to subsequent cases, and it is extremely
reluctant ito find an employer's defenses "patently frivolous."" 35 Evi111. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1970); see AF of L v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
For an outline of NLRB procedure in representation proceedings, see 29 C.F.R. §§
101.17-.24 (1974).
112. See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
113. See note 15 supra.
114. See note 15 supra.
115. See, e.g., Orion Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (May 16, 1974), 1974 CCH NLRB
Dec. 34,308; Ameri-Crete Ready Mix Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (Nov. 21, 1973),

1974 CCH NLRB Dec. 33,498. In Ameri-Crete, the union had obtained a majority
of authorization cards from the employees in an organizational campaign at the employer's plant. The employer refused to recognize or bargain with the union and engaged
in other unfair labor practices, including the questioning of employees as to why they

had signed the cards. The Board refused to order reimbursement of the union's legal
expenses because the employer's defense-that the union did not actually command a
majority-was not meritless on its face. 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. at 33,499. A similar
result was reached in Orion, where the employer withdrew recognition of a union and
refused to bargain based on its "objective belief" that at least twenty-four of forty-four
unit employees did not support the union. 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. 34,309. See note
48 supra.
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dently the rule will be applied in only the most flagrant cases and notin cases where the employer's objections -are in any sense arguably reasonable. Thus, the employer with marginally debatable objections
should not fear the -award of litigation expenses against him if he
presses his objections in litigation.
One further argument exists against the award of attorney's fees
under section 10(c). The charging party as well as the charged party
may seek to avoid compliance with the Act by engaging in frivolous
litigation. The former may file charges which are totally without merit
in order to harass the latter party by causing a complaint -to be issued
against him. For example, an employer may file frivolous charges
against a union for the purpose of disrupting an organizational campaign, thereby delaying or avoiding unionism in his plant. Yet, the
broad affirmative action clause, and hence the remedy, applies only to
the charged party. The only sanction the charging party risks is to
have his complaint dismissed.1 16 Thus, the charged party who engages
in frivolous litigation is 'held liable for these expenses, whereas the
charging party who engages in the same conduct escapes liability. Assuming that even-handed treatment was intended, this result suggests
that Congress never intended to give the Board the power -to award
litigation expenses.1 17
But this argument overlooks the assigned task of the General
Counsel and his representatives in investigating the charges made prior
to the issuance of a complaint.118 Indeed, the NLRB has established
a procedure in which stringent requirements of proof must be met to
keep the charges from being dismissed immediately.' 19 Even if the
complaint was issued, it would surely become readily apparent at the
initial hearing that the case lacked 'any merit. The charges could still
be dismissed before the charged party had incurred any substantial
costs.
REIMBURSEMENT OF THE BOARD'S OWN LITIGATION EXPENSES
In Tiidee,120 -the Board first asserted its authority 'to order reim116. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). The statute provides:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of
the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings
of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint ....

Id.

117. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 352 n.*
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
118. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
119. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1974).
120. 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1974) (Tiidee I supp. decision). For a discussion of this
case and those related to it, see note 24 and text accompanying notes 24-43 supra.
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bursement to itself for its own costs in the investigation, preparation,
and presentation of cases where the charged party's defenses to the

complaint are frivolous. The Board's assertion of authority was soon
after confirmed in an unrelated opinion of the District of Columbia Cir-

121
cuit Court of Appeals in Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB.
The scope of -the power was later limited by the same court in International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB.' 2 2 That opinion, which
considered the Board's ruling in Tiidee, limited the power to those situ-

ations like the one present in Food Store-where the employer had
conducted a "comprehensive pattern of illegal resistance to any form
of unionism" with repeated violations of the NLRA. 123 The Board's
reasoning in Tiidee for awarding litigation expenses to itself was the
same as the reasoning it used to justify the award of these expenses to

the charging party-to discourage frivolous litigation in order to in'
sure "speedy access to uncrowded Board and court dockets,"'
thus to effectuate the purposes of the Act.

24

and

The Board's award in this situation is roughly analogous to the
power of federal courts to assess an appellant with the counsel fees and

other litigation expenses of the appellee in cases where the appellant
takes a frivolous appeal for the purpose of delay. 25 The fact-finding
hearing before the administrative law judge is the functional equivalent
of a trial court and the Board is the reviewing body. 2 6 The reimburse121. 476 F.2d 546, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds and remanded,
417 U.S. 1 (1974).
122. 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
123. Id. at 357.
124. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1236 (Tiidee I supp. decision).
125. See In re Midland United Co., 141 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1944) (per curiam)
(where an appeal was wholly frivolous and was taken for purposes of delay, appellees
were awarded as damages $1000 for counsel fees); 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1970) ("Where
a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the court in its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just damages for his delay and single or
double costs."); FED. R. App. P. 38 ("If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.");
Brief for Respondent, supra note 102, at 15.
126. Pursuant to section 8(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
557(b) (1970), the fact that the administrative law judge may make an initial or recommended decision does not withdraw power from the agency to review the case to vhatever extent the agency chooses:
The agency may still make its own findings under the Act, which provides in
[section 8(a)] that even though [administrative law judges] make initial or
recommended decisions, "the agency shall . . .have all the powers it would
have in making the initial decision." The words "all the powers" clearly include determinations of law, fact, policy, and discretion. The agency is clearly
free to substitute judgment. . . on any or all questions. 2 K. DAvIs § 10.04,
at 18.
The rules and regulations of the NLRB, 29 C.F.R. § 102 (1974), recognize the discretion of the Board to institute de novo proceedings upon the filing of exceptions to

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1975:352

ment under this rationale would be for the expenses of the General
Counsel in prosecuting the case before the appellate-type tribunal, the
Board.
However, the considerations involved in determining whether it
is proper for the Board to order reimbursement to itself for its own
litigation expenses differ from those which justify such an award to a
charging party who is forced to bear litigation costs because of the
frivolous litigation of the charged party. Unlike the charging party
who must incur the unnecessary litigation costs in order to protect his
rights under the Act, the Board's express statutory function is to enforce those rights, especially in situations where the opposing party is
acting in an unreasonable manner. The Board is an 'administrative
agency established and funded for the purlose of settling the rights of
parties in labor disputes. It seems only reasonable, then, that it should
not, without explicit statutory authorization, be reimbursed for the expenses it incurs in the discharge of its statutory duties.
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how returning the Board to its
status quo ante would effectuate the policies of the NLRA in a permissible manner. Of course, the award would have the effect of discouraging frivolous litigation and hence would facilitate the accomplishment
of the purposes of ithe Act by keeping Board and court dockets clear.
But -assessing the charged party with the Board's litigation expenses
would not in itself seem to have any affirmative policy effects beyond
deterrence.12 7 Yet, the objective of pure deterrence was held128to be
improper by the Supreme Court in Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB:
[I]t is not enough to justify the Board's requirements to say that they
would have the effect of deterring persons from violating the Act. That
argument proves too much, for if such a deterrent effect is sufficient to
the administrative law judge's decision: [T]he Board may decide the matter forthwith
upon the record, or after oral argument, or may reopen the record and receive further
evidence .

. . ."

Id.

§ 102.48(b)

(emphasis added).

These rules also add that

"[w]here exception is taken to a factual finding of an administrative law judge, the
Board, in determining whether the finding is contrary to a preponderance of the evidence, may limit its consideration to such portions of the record as are specified in the
exceptions, the supporting brief, and the answering brief." Id. § 102.48(c). Apparently
the latter course is most frequently adopted, leading one group of commentators to state
unequivocally that "the Board will consider the case on the record." R. SmrrH, L. MRIUF=LD & T. ST.ANTOINE, supra note 9, at 66. See also L. SmVERBERG, How TO TAKE
A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (3d ed. K. McGuiness, 1967).

Therefore, the functional analogy drawn in the text is appropriate.
127. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 357 n.***
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
128. 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
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sustain an order of the Board, it would be free to set up any system of
penalties which it would deem adequate to that end. 129
Moreover, since the award is not one which makes the injured party,the union in this case-whole, it also may fall prey to the Court's doctrine that the Board has no power to issue punitive relief. 130 Therefore, under either the rule forbidding pure deterrence or that proscribing punitive relief, a Board order directing reimbursement of itself for
its own litigation expenses is an unauthorized means of advancing the
policies of the Act.
On the whole, then, it would seem that the Board's award of litigation expenses to itself in the absence of express statutory authority is
improper in any case. There are substantial reasons why a party in
an NLRB proceeding should be reimbursed,' 3 ' but none of these reasons apply to the Board. A party is vindicating his own rights, while
the Board is executing a statutory duty. In light of the Board's statutory assignment to settle labor disputes whether or not such disputes
involve frivolous litigation, the need to keep the Board's dockets clear
is simply not a sufficient justification for abandoning the rule prohibiting tribunals from awarding attorney's fees.' 32
CONCLUSION

In light of the inadequacy of conventional NLRB remedies in refusal-to-bargain cases, it is clear that new remedies must be developed
if the policies of the NLRA are -to be fully effectuated. So long as
Congress fails to act on the matter, it is the responsibility of the Board
and the courts to develop new forms of relief within the scope of existing NLRB remedial authority. One alternative-make-whole reliefhas been offered by the District of Columbia Circuit. Yet, while the
make-whole remedy is probably the most effective remedy in this situation, the Board arguably lacks the authority to grant this kind of relief.
Moreover, the Board's present reluctance to adopt the remedy makes
its current usefulness marginal.
The award of attorney's fees, on the other hand, has been adopted
129. Id. at 12. For a discussion of Republic Steel, see note 108 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 105-08 supra.
131. See text accompanying notes 84-92 supra.

132. Of course it is an entirely different situation when the Board must seek enforcement of one of its orders in a court of appeals. In this case, when a statute expressly
authorizes such an award, it would be entirely proper for the court to award the Board
its expenses in preparing for the enforcement proceeding since an appellate court has
the authority to award attorney's fees and other litigation expenses when an appeal is

frivolous. See note 125 supra.
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by the Board and a1ipears to be within the remedial authority of the
NLRB. Unless and until the make-whole remedy is -accepted by the
courts, the attorney's fees remedy can and should be used to compensate partially for this weakness in the NLRA. Furthermore, if makewhole relief eventually is determined to be within the Board's remedial
power, the award of attorney's fees would still be a useful additional
remedy in appropriate cases.
Reimbursing the union for the expenses it incurs in the investigation, preparation, and presentation of cases where an employer refuses
to bargain for patently frivolous reasons cannot, of course, be viewed
as an equivalent substitute for make-whole relief. Moreover, the relative effectiveness of the remedy will depend upon the amount of involvement required by the union's private counsel, the length of the
employer's unjustified delay, and the financial strengths of the parties
involved. Nevertheless, the remedy should not be overlooked as a
means of effectuating the purposes of the NLRA, whether it is used
in lieu of or in addition to make-whole relief. The award of attorney's
fees and other litigation expenses is a necessary and authorized addition to the NLRB's remedial arsenal.

